IRAN, THE BAB AL-MANDEB AND THE MAKING OF A NEW MIDDLE EASTERN SUPERPOWER?
Could Tehran’s growing influence over two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints fundamentally change the balance of power in the Middle East?
There are moments in international politics when a military development in one country suddenly becomes a problem for the entire world.
The latest Houthi advance in Yemen may be one of those moments.
The reported capture of key positions around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, including Perim Island, has dramatically changed the strategic picture in the Red Sea. The Houthis have also captured Mokha and consolidated their position along Yemen's Red Sea coast. Because the Houthis are closely aligned with Iran, this development has immediately raised a much larger question:
Is Iran gradually moving from being merely a powerful regional actor to becoming the dominant strategic power of the Middle East?
The answer is not yet a simple "yes."
But something much more important may be happening.
Iran is accumulating strategic leverage.
And in international politics, leverage can sometimes be more powerful than territory.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BAB AL-MANDEB
The Bab al-Mandeb is not just another stretch of water.
It is the maritime gateway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Ships travelling between Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal depend heavily on this corridor.
Its importance becomes even clearer when considered alongside the Strait of Hormuz.
Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and is one of the world's most important energy chokepoints. Recent developments have already placed Hormuz under severe pressure.
Now consider the geography.
Iran sits beside Hormuz.
Its allies and partners have gained a powerful position near Bab al-Mandeb.
Suddenly, Tehran's strategic influence is no longer confined to the Persian Gulf.
It can potentially affect maritime traffic at both ends of the Arabian Peninsula.
That is an extraordinary geopolitical advantage.
The significance is not necessarily that Iran can permanently close both waterways whenever it wishes. That would invite enormous international military and economic retaliation.
The real power is the ability to say:
"I can make your access to these waterways more expensive, more dangerous and less predictable."
That alone can change the behaviour of governments.
IRAN DOES NOT NEED TO OWN THE STRAIT TO BENEFIT FROM IT
This is perhaps the most important point.
The Houthis are not simply the Iranian military.
They are a Yemeni movement with their own political objectives, ideology, leadership and military capabilities.
Therefore, it would be an oversimplification to say:
"Iran now owns Bab al-Mandeb."
It does not.
But Iran does not necessarily need direct ownership.
For decades, Tehran has developed a strategy based partly on relationships with armed non-state actors and political partners across the Middle East.
That network has included actors in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere.
The strategic logic is powerful:
Instead of placing Iranian soldiers everywhere, Iran can develop partnerships with forces capable of threatening the interests of its adversaries from different geographical directions.
This creates what could be described as a strategic depth.
The Houthis therefore become particularly important because Yemen occupies an extraordinary geographical position.
Iran itself is thousands of kilometres away from the Mediterranean and Red Sea.
The Houthis are not.
That geographical advantage can give Tehran influence far beyond Iran's physical borders.
THE TWO-STRAIT PROBLEM
Imagine looking at the Middle East from a map.
To the east is Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.
To the southwest is Yemen and the Bab al-Mandeb.
Between them lies the Arabian Peninsula.
If Iran can maintain substantial influence over actors operating around both strategic waterways, it creates a geopolitical pressure system surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
This is why Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and other regional governments cannot simply dismiss what is happening in Yemen.
The issue is no longer exclusively about Yemen.
It is about who possesses the ability to influence the movement of energy and global commerce through the region.
Reuters reported that the Houthi advance toward Bab al-Mandeb has added pressure to global oil supplies while Iran's position around Hormuz is already creating a separate strategic problem.
That combination could become extraordinarily powerful.
COULD IRAN USE THIS TO CONTROL MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS?
"Control" may be too strong a word.
But influence?
Absolutely.
Iran could use its position in at least five major ways.
1. ENERGY LEVERAGE
Energy is the first weapon of geography.
If instability affects both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, oil and gas transportation becomes more expensive.
Insurance premiums rise.
Shipping companies reroute vessels.
Delivery times increase.
Oil prices rise.
European and Asian economies feel the consequences.
And suddenly an Iranian regional dispute becomes a global economic problem.
That gives Tehran something every major power wants:
the ability to impose costs far beyond its borders.
2. DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE
Countries negotiate differently with a country that can hurt them.
This does not mean Iran would necessarily threaten every Arab country.
In fact, Tehran could pursue something much more sophisticated.
It could say:
We do not want confrontation. We want recognition of our security interests.
Iran could then demand negotiations over sanctions, maritime security, regional military deployments, nuclear issues, economic relations and political influence.
The greater the cost of ignoring Iran, the greater Tehran's negotiating power becomes.
3. MILITARY DETERRENCE
Iran's power is not based exclusively on conventional military strength.
Its missile, drone and asymmetric capabilities provide it with ways of threatening adversaries without necessarily fighting a traditional war.
Its geographical position also places it close to several American military facilities and major energy infrastructure in the Gulf.
Iran's missile and nuclear capabilities have been central to the strategic calculations surrounding the country for years.
Add the Houthi position in Yemen and the strategic picture becomes more complicated.
An adversary confronting Iran may have to calculate threats coming from multiple directions.
That is deterrence.
4. IRAN COULD BECOME THE CENTRE OF A NEW REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM
This is where things become particularly interesting.
For decades, the Middle Eastern security system was heavily influenced by the United States.
American military bases, naval forces, alliances and security partnerships provided the foundation of the regional order.
But if regional countries begin to conclude that Washington cannot guarantee their security indefinitely, they may start looking for alternatives.
And that could create a completely different Middle East.
Iran could attempt to present itself as the unavoidable regional power with which every major government must negotiate.
Not necessarily because everybody loves Iran.
Rather because everybody must take Iran into account.
That distinction is extremely important.
A country does not have to be universally liked to become powerful.
It has to become difficult to ignore.
5. IRAN COULD TURN GEOGRAPHY INTO GLOBAL POWER
This may ultimately be Tehran's greatest opportunity.
Iran sits at the crossroads of several strategic regions:
- the Persian Gulf;
- Central Asia;
- the Caucasus;
- the Middle East;
- the Indian Ocean;
- and the broader energy corridor linking Asia and Europe.
Iran therefore possesses something that cannot easily be manufactured:
geography.
If Tehran can combine geography with military technology, missiles, drones, nuclear capability or nuclear latency, regional alliances, energy resources, diplomatic relationships and influence through partner organisations, its international bargaining power could increase dramatically.
The result would be a country capable of affecting decisions far beyond its borders.
That is the foundation of great-power behaviour.
BUT WHAT ABOUT IRAN'S ARAB NEIGHBOURS?
This is perhaps the most sensitive question.
Would Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Iraq become Iranian satellites?
Not necessarily.
In fact, the opposite could happen.
Iran's growing power could encourage Arab states to become more independent strategically.
Saudi Arabia, for example, could accelerate military modernization, diversify its alliances and strengthen relations with China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Europe and the United States.
The Gulf states could increase cooperation among themselves.
Oman could become even more important as a mediator.
Qatar could deepen its diplomatic balancing strategy.
The UAE could continue pursuing a highly pragmatic foreign policy.
Iraq would become particularly complicated because of its geographic position, internal politics and relationships with both Iran and the Arab world.
So the rise of Iran does not automatically mean the disappearance of Arab sovereignty.
It could instead produce a new balance of power.
THE BIGGEST DANGER: THE SECURITY DILEMMA
There is a paradox here.
The stronger Iran becomes, the more threatened some of its neighbours may feel.
The more threatened they feel, the more weapons they acquire.
The more weapons they acquire, the more threatened Iran feels.
Then Iran strengthens its military.
And the cycle continues.
This is known in international relations as the security dilemma.
It can produce an arms race even when neither side originally wants a full-scale war.
And there is another dangerous possibility.
If Arab governments conclude that conventional military power alone cannot deter Iran, some may reconsider their relationship with nuclear technology.
That could produce a nuclear arms race across the Middle East.
Analysts have already warned that a nuclear Iran could create powerful incentives for countries such as Saudi Arabia and others to reconsider their own nuclear options.
That would be one of the most dangerous consequences of Iran's rise.
HAS IRAN NOW BECOME A SUPERPOWER?
No — not yet.
And we must be careful with the word superpower.
Historically, a superpower is a state possessing extraordinary military, economic, technological, diplomatic and global reach.
The United States and, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union fit that description.
Iran does not yet possess the global economic, technological, military and alliance infrastructure required to place it in that category.
But calling Iran "not a superpower" should not be interpreted as saying Iran is weak.
Far from it.
Iran may increasingly qualify as a major regional power with global strategic influence.
That distinction matters.
A country does not need aircraft carriers circling every ocean to exercise international influence.
Sometimes a missile capability, an energy resource, a strategic coastline and a powerful network of partners can produce extraordinary leverage.
Iran appears to understand this very well.
THE IRANIAN MODEL OF POWER IS DIFFERENT
Perhaps the greatest mistake would be to judge Iran exclusively by Western definitions of military power.
Iran has developed a different model.
It combines:
Geography + missiles + drones + energy + ideology + proxy/partner networks + diplomacy + strategic patience.
The objective is not necessarily to defeat America in a conventional war.
That would be extremely difficult.
The objective may instead be to make American dominance in the region increasingly expensive and difficult to maintain.
That is a completely different strategy.
And it may be working to some extent.
Recent analysis has argued that the war involving Iran has already altered the regional balance and increased Tehran's strategic leverage around Hormuz.
The Houthi advance around Bab al-Mandeb potentially adds another layer to that leverage.
THE WEST NOW FACES A DIFFICULT QUESTION
Suppose the United States and its allies decide to retake Bab al-Mandeb militarily.
What happens?
They may have to conduct a major military operation in Yemen.
That means air power.
Naval forces.
Ground intelligence.
Special operations.
Protection of commercial shipping.
And potentially years of military commitment.
But if they do nothing, Iran-aligned forces may consolidate their position.
Neither option is attractive.
That is precisely what makes the situation strategically valuable to Tehran.
The ability to force your opponent to choose between two difficult options is itself a form of power.
CHINA AND RUSSIA COULD ALSO BENEFIT
Iran's rise would not happen in isolation.
China needs secure trade routes and energy.
Russia wants to weaken Western influence and expand its relationships across the Middle East.
Iran could therefore become an increasingly important partner for both countries.
But Tehran must be careful.
China and Russia are not charitable organisations.
They pursue their own national interests.
If Iran becomes strategically important to China, Beijing will want stability.
If Iran becomes useful to Russia, Moscow will seek diplomatic and strategic advantages.
Therefore, Iran could gain from great-power competition without becoming subordinate to either.
That would be a sophisticated diplomatic achievement.
THE ARAB WORLD HAS A CHOICE
The rise of Iranian influence could push Arab states toward one of two futures.
Future One: Confrontation
Arab states strengthen military alliances, acquire more advanced weapons and attempt to contain Iran.
Iran responds by strengthening its networks.
The region becomes more militarised.
Proxy wars multiply.
Nuclear proliferation becomes more likely.
The Middle East enters another dangerous arms race.
Future Two: Strategic Accommodation
Arab states recognise Iran's growing power but refuse to become its clients.
Iran recognises that permanent confrontation with its Arab neighbours is economically and politically unsustainable.
The two sides negotiate.
Security arrangements emerge.
Maritime navigation is protected.
Economic relations expand.
And competition continues without becoming permanent war.
The second option would be far better for the Middle East.
But it requires something the region has historically struggled to produce:
strategic trust.
THE REAL QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER IRAN CAN CONQUER THE MIDDLE EAST
Iran does not need to conquer the Middle East.
That would be extraordinarily costly and probably impossible.
The more sophisticated objective would be to create a situation in which:
No major decision concerning the Middle East can be made without considering Tehran.
That is a far more realistic definition of regional dominance.
If Saudi Arabia wants to negotiate oil policy, Iran matters.
If the United States wants to deploy forces in the Gulf, Iran matters.
If Europe wants secure trade through the Red Sea, Iran matters.
If China wants uninterrupted energy supplies, Iran matters.
If Russia wants influence in the Middle East, Iran matters.
If Israel wants to plan its regional security strategy, Iran matters.
If Arab governments want to design a new regional security architecture, Iran matters.
That is influence.
And influence is the currency of great-power politics.
FROM REGIONAL POWER TO GLOBAL POWER
For Iran to genuinely become a global great power, however, military leverage alone will not be enough.
Tehran would need to transform strategic influence into sustainable national power.
That means building:
A stronger economy.
Advanced technology.
Industrial capacity.
Stable energy exports.
Modern infrastructure.
Scientific research.
A globally competitive manufacturing sector.
Strong diplomatic relationships.
And a political system capable of sustaining national development.
If Iran achieves these things while maintaining its strategic military capabilities, its influence could expand dramatically.
The greatest Iranian victory would therefore not be simply controlling a maritime chokepoint.
It would be transforming geopolitical leverage into economic and technological power.
THE GREAT IRONY OF THE BAB AL-MANDEB
The irony is that the Houthis' advance could potentially create consequences much larger than Yemen itself.
A conflict involving a relatively poor country could affect:
oil prices, shipping costs, inflation, European trade, Asian manufacturing, American politics and the strategic calculations of Arab governments.
That is what makes geography so powerful.
A narrow strip of water can sometimes have more geopolitical importance than a large piece of land.
And Iran may now have influence around two such strategic points.
SO, IS THIS IRAN'S MOMENT?
Perhaps.
But history teaches us that military victories can be temporary.
Holding territory is difficult.
Holding a strategic chokepoint is even more difficult.
And converting military success into lasting political influence is harder still.
Iran therefore faces a historic opportunity — but also a historic danger.
If Tehran uses its growing leverage to negotiate, build economic relationships, reassure its neighbours and establish itself as a responsible regional power, it could emerge from this crisis substantially stronger.
But if it interprets military success as permission for unlimited expansion, it could trigger exactly the opposite result.
Arab states could unite against it.
Israel could intensify military action.
The United States could rebuild its regional coalition.
China could pressure Tehran to preserve commercial stability.
And a new Middle Eastern arms race could begin.
CONCLUSION: THE BIRTH OF A NEW MIDDLE EAST?
The reported Houthi takeover of the Bab al-Mandeb is therefore much bigger than a Yemeni military victory.
It potentially represents another stage in the transformation of the Middle Eastern balance of power.
Iran has spent decades developing influence that does not always depend on direct occupation.
Now, with pressure around the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian-aligned forces gaining positions around Bab al-Mandeb, Tehran potentially possesses leverage over two strategic gateways of enormous importance to global commerce and energy.
But Iran is not yet a superpower.
It is something potentially more interesting:
a regional power developing the instruments necessary to influence global politics.
The next chapter will depend on what Tehran does with that power.
Will Iran use its new leverage to become the dominant power of the Middle East?
Will the Arab states organise themselves to contain it?
Will America remain the ultimate security guarantor of the Gulf?
Will China emerge as the new external power broker?
Or will the Middle East eventually develop a multipolar system in which Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and the Gulf states balance one another?
One thing is increasingly clear:
The Middle East of yesterday may no longer exist.
And if Iran succeeds in converting control, influence and strategic geography into economic strength, diplomatic authority and technological power, the question may eventually change from:
"Can Iran become a superpower?"
to:
"How did Iran become impossible for the world to ignore?"
Ahmad M. Salihu
ahmad.msalihu22@gmail.com
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